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The "Charitable" Privilege: Evaluating the Status of
Property Tax Exemptions for Institutions of Purely
Public Charity in Pennsylvania
Rebecca L. Traylor*
ABSTRACT

Pennsylvania has historically exempted institutions of purely public
charity from paying property taxes, though that practice is currently
underfirefrom criticswho argue many charitiesno longer warrantthis
exemption. Adding to this tension is a struggle between the Pennsylvania General Assembly and Pennsylvania Supreme Court over who has
the power to define "institutionsof purely public charity, " which has
culminated in the introduction of Senate Bill 4, a proposed constitutional amendment which purports to give thatpower solely to the legislature. This article explores the evolution of institutions of purely
public charity in Pennsylvaniaand explores the argumentssurrounding
Senate Bill 4. Additionally, the articleparticularlyexplains how Senate
Bill 4 is contradictoryto the intent of the originalconstitutionalprovision regardinginstitutions ofpurely public charity, which was intended
to limit legislative abuse. The article also briefly describes problems
of lost revenue due to property tax exemptions and concerns that many
tax-exempt organizationsno longer warrantthat status, and concludes
by exploring various measures that can be adopted to limit the existing
criteriadefining which institutions qualify as purely public charities.
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I. INTRODUCTION
For the last several years, there has scarcely been an issue more
widely worried about, complained about, or debated about than
money. With the economy arguably not what it once was, both individuals and local governments are finding new ways to raise
money and to save money. One hotly contested avenue to do so has
been to question the tax-exempt status of charities and other nonprofits, many of which have historically been property tax-exempt.
In Pennsylvania, which is home to numerous large charitable organizations that could potentially be liable for several million dollars if their tax-exempt statuses were to be revoked, these challenges mean a great deal. Complicating the issue even further is
the growing concern that many of these charitable organizations
are no longer actually "charitable," and therefore no longer warrant
their charitable tax-exempt status. Consequently, the law of charitable property tax exemptions in Pennsylvania today is in quite a
precarious position.
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According to the Pennsylvania Constitution, "[t]he General Assembly may by law exempt from taxation ... [i]nstitutions of purely
public charity."' Early case law contemplated these institutions of
purely public charity as those entities possessing eleemosynary
characteristics, 2 giving more gratuitously than for a price, and reserving no private or pecuniary return. 3 A basic premise of taxation
is that "[t]axes are not penalties, but are contributions which all
inhabitants are expected to make . .. for the support of the manifold
activities of government." 4 Therefore, institutions of purely public
charity are exempted from making tax contributions because the
charitable entity is providing a service to the public that the government would otherwise have to provide. 5 This has been commonly referred to as a "quid pro quo" between the institution and
the government. 6 However, while the charity earns its exemption
in part by providing benefits to both society and the government,
many organizations that are not charitable also provide benefits to
both society and the government. 7 As a result, Pennsylvania courts
have continually clarified that institutions do not qualify for tax exemptions merely because they have good intentions.8
In the last several years, there has been a heated public debate
over exactly what kinds of charitable institutions should qualify for
tax exemptions. 9 One major concern that has in part propelled this
1.

PA. CONST. art. VIII,

§ 2(a)(v)

(emphasis added).

2. Young Men's Christian Ass'n of Germantown v. City of Phila., 187 A. 204, 208 (Pa.
1936) (noting the court's use of the word eleemosynary here means that the institution must
have a charitable characteristic not found in private profit institutions).
3. Trs. of Acad. of Protestant Episcopal Church v. Taylor, 25 A. 55, 56 (Pa. 1892).

4.

YMCA of Germantown, 187 A. at 210.

5. Id. In this early case, the court generally reasoned that "the exemption from taxation
of institutions of public charity is founded on the fact that such a charity is assuming a share
of the public burden." Id. When an institution gives gratuitously, it relieves the government
of some of its responsibilities. See generally id.
6. Id. (explaining the general idea that "[a]ny institution which by its charitable activities relieves the government of part of this burden is conferring a pecuniary benefit upon the
body politic, and in receiving exemption from taxation it is merely being given a 'quid pro
quo' for its services in providing something which otherwise the government would have to
provide").

7.

City of Wash. v. Bd. of Assessment Appeals of Wash. Cty., 704 A.2d 120, 126 (Pa.

1997) (Nigro, J., dissenting) (explaining that while many charitable institutions are valuable
to society, many private entities are as well, and "[i]t does not logically follow that they are
charitable").

8.

See Hosp. Utilization Project v. Commonwealth, 487 A.2d 1306, 1316 (Pa. 1985) (ex-

plaining that mere non-profit status does not mandate exemptions from taxation); YMCA of
Germantown, 187 A. at 211 (stating that "[e]ven the most praiseworthy institutions must
expect to support the government by paying taxes when it engages in commercial activities
no matter how it uses the net proceeds of such activities").
9. PA. DEP'T OF THE AUDITOR GEN., A Special Report:A Review of PotentialLost Revenue
Due to Property Tax Exemptions (Dec. 2014), http://www.paauditor.gov/Media/Default/Reports/RPTPropTaxExemptions_12182014_LGW2_Final2.pdf ("Pennsylvania is at a major
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scrutiny is that increasingly "cash-strapped" municipalities are losing out on millions of dollars of revenue because tax-exempt organizations own so much of the real estate in the cities in which they
are located. 10 In Pennsylvania, this issue is exacerbated by the fact
that the state is a hotbed for institutions of higher education and
massive hospital systems, both of which have historically been taxexempt." Furthermore, there is a concern that the tax-exempt institutions that own this real estate look less like eleemosynary entities that give gratuitously and more like large for-profit corporations. 12 Critics of some of these tax-exempt institutions argue that
the institutions, among other things, no longer offer many free services; 13 generate huge profits not properly invested back into the

crossroads in the decades-long debate over how to define and review the property-tax exempt
status of nonprofit organizations."); Property Tax Exemptions Cost County Millions,
ALLEGHENY CTY. CONTROLLER CHELSA WAGNER'S TAXPAYER ALERTS (June 2012),
https://www.alleghenycontroller.com/admin/attachments/uploads/444121 IControllerChelsaWagnerTaxpayerAlertPropertyTaxExemptions.pdf ("After decades of local governments in Pennsylvania questioning the tax exempt status of certain organizations, the question remains, 'are these exemptions fair? In these challenging financial times, it is our duty
and responsibility to address [these] questions.").
10. See PA. DEP'T OF THE AUDITOR GEN., supra note 9. This report, released by the Pennsylvania Auditor General, provides taxpayers with data on "potential tax revenue from properties that are currently exempt from property taxes" in light of the mounting financial challenges facing counties, municipalities and school districts. Id. Table 2 shows that the total
potential property tax liability for tax exempt properties in 2014, for example, is:

$619,732,732 in Allegheny County; $164,500,125 in Bucks County; $138,310,233 in Dauphin
County; and $75,478,602 in Erie County. Id. The tax-exempt properties considered by this
chart include government owned properties, K-12 schools, churches, charitable organizations, hospitals, and higher education institutions. Id.
11. See generally id. For example, Table 3 also shows the total potential property tax
liability for medical facilities with purely public charity status in 2014. Id. Those totals

amount to: $76,124,321 for Allegheny County; $15,557,615 for Bucks County; $16,512,001
for Dauphin County; and $7,181,931 for Erie County. Id. See also infra notes 27 and 28.
12. See Loren D. Prescott, Jr., Pennsylvania Charities, Tax Exemption, and the Institu-

tions of Purely Public Charity Act, 73 TEMP. L. REV. 951, 951-952 (2000) (noting the recent
aggressive challenges to many tax-exempt charities in Pennsylvania and how there is a "public perception of most charities as wealthy"); Natasha Lindstrom, Nonprofit tax break proposal in Pennsylvania divisive, TRIBLIVE NEWS (Apr. 5, 2015), http://triblive.com/news/allegheny/809 1700-74/pennsylvania-nonprofits-amendment#axzz3nYZN35sE
(quoting
City
Controller Michael Lamb as stating "Pittsburgh is now home to mega nonprofits that look
more like corporate empires than social service providers"); Chris Potter, Views on taxing
nonprofits aired at hearing on proposed Senate bill, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Mar. 13,
2015), http://www.post-gazette.com/news/state/20 15/03/13/Views-on-taxing-nonprofits-aired
-at-hearing/stories/201503120217 (quoting City Controller Michael Lamb as stating "[t]here
is a big difference between the community food bank ... and the corporate land bank that
continues to take properties off our tax rolls").
13. Elisabeth Rosenthal, Benefits Questionedin Tax Breaks for Nonprofit Hospitals,N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 16, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/17/us/benefits-questioned-in-taxbreaks-for-nonprofit-hospitals.html?_r=1 (quoting John D. Colombo, a professor of tax law at
the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, who stated that "[t]he standard nonprofit hospital doesn't act like a charity any more than Microsoft does-they also give some stuff away
for free," but that the hospital's primary purpose is to provide health care for a fee).
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company's charitable purpose; 14 and pay their executives exorbitant
sums of money.1 5 In essence, the argument is that many of these
"charitable" institutions are hardly distinguishable from the forprofit companies that they compete with.1 6
The issue of charitable tax exemptions has also become a major
source of tension between the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and the
General Assembly, specifically regarding who has the final say on
defining "institutions of purely public charity."17 In response to Mesivtah Eitz Chaim of Bobov, Incorporated v. Pike County Board of
Assessment Appeals, a Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision clarifying that organizations must meet the court's definition of "institutions of purely public charity" before considering any criteria enacted by the General Assembly,1 8 the Pennsylvania Legislature proposed a constitutional amendment designed to give it the sole power
to determine the criteria for institutions of purely public charity. 19
Supporters of the proposed amendment, Senate Bill 4, believe that
the amendment will eliminate the purported confusion caused by
using the court's criteria and will allow for more consistency and
clarity in determining which organizations qualify as institutions
of purely public charity.20 However, those against the amendment
14. Id. (discussing the argument that most hospitals are not providing the value of their
tax exemptions in community benefit and the low average percent of operating costs spent
on charity care and community benefit by hospitals).
15. Matt Krupnick & Jon Marcus, Think university administrators'salaries are high?
Critics say their benefits are lavish, HECHINGER REP. (Aug. 5, 2015), http://hechingerreport.org/think-university-administrators-salaries-are-high-critics-say-their-benefits-arelavish/ (discussing the practice that university presidents and top administrators receive
high salaries, receive housing allowances, and receive other perks such as cars and club dues
paid for).
16. See Prescott,supra note 12 and accompanying text.
17. Compare Mesivtah Eitz Chaim of Bobov, Inc. v. Pike Cty. Bd. of Assessment Appeals,
44 A.3d 3, 9 (Pa. 2012) (holding that an entity must first establish that it is an "institution
of purely public charity" under the test established by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court before considering any statute in place by the legislature), with S.B. 4, P.N. 347, Session of 2015
(Pa. 2015) (proposing a constitutional amendment that would change the Pennsylvania Constitution to read "[t]he General Assembly may, by law . .
[e]stablish uniform standards and
qualifications which shall be the criteria to determine qualifications as institutions of purely
public charity"). See also Chris Potter & Rich Lord, Pennsylvania bill debates definition of
taxable charities, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Mar. 30, 2015), http://www.post-gazette.com/news/state/2015/03/30/Pennsylvania-Senate-Bill-4-debates-definition-of-taxablecharities/stories/201503300012 (discussing the history of granting tax exemptions in Pennsylvania and the roles of the courts and the legislature in deciding questions of tax exemptions).

18.
19.

See Mesivtah, 44 A.3d at 9.
See S.B. 4, P.N. 347, Session of 2015 (Pa. 2015).

20. Rich Lord, Proposed Pennsylvania tax-exemption amendment stalls, PITTSBURGH
POST-GAZETTE (Mar. 27, 2015, 12:00 AM), http://www.post-gazette.com/news/state/2015/
03/2 7/Proposed-Pennsylvania-tax-exemption-amendment-stalls/stories/20 1503270175 (discussing the argument made by nonprofits-supporters of the amendment-that they want
clear standards and clarity to prevent frivolous challenges to their tax-exempt status).
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worry that it will expand the legislature's power and make it easier
for organizations to qualify for charitable tax exemptions. 2 1 Possibly even more worrisome is the proposed amendment's potential infringement on the doctrine of separation of powers, which prohibits
the legislature from interfering with the court's role in interpreting
the constitution. 22
Part II of this comment will explore the evolution of what it
means to be an institution of purely public charity in Pennsylvania.
Part III will explain the arguments surrounding the proposed constitutional amendment, Senate Bill 4. Additionally, Part III will
explain how the proposed amendment is contradictory to the intent
of the original constitutional provision regarding institutions of
purely public charity, which was intended to limit legislative abuse
in granting tax exemptions. Part IV will briefly explain the problem
of lost revenue due to property tax exemptions and explore the concern that many tax-exempt organizations no longer warrant charitable exemptions, and the arguments against those concerns. Finally, Part V will explore various measures that the Pennsylvania
Legislature can adopt to limit the existing criteria defining which
institutions qualify as purely public charities, as part of an effort to
prevent institutions from qualifying for tax exemptions merely because they have good intentions.

II. THE EVOLUTION OF "INSTITUTIONS OF PURELY PUBLIC
CHARITY" IN PENNSYLVANIA
A.

The Early Practiceof Exemption by Special Legislative Grant

The concept of granting tax exemptions to charitable organizations has existed in Pennsylvania for over one hundred years. 23 Before the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1874, tax exemptions were

21. For example, "municipal officials, employees of taxing districts such as schools, and
those who believe large nonprofits such as hospital systems and universities should pay taxes
when they behave more like for-profits than charities[ fear the Legislature would curtail
their ability to challenge tax exemptions," which would ultimately disadvantage local economies. Id.
22. See generally Mesivtah, 44 A.3d at 7. "While the General Assembly necessarily must
attempt to interpret the Constitution in carrying out its duties, the judiciary is not bound to
the legislative judgment concerning the proper interpretation of constitutional terms." Id.
(internal quotation omitted). "The General Assembly cannot displace [the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's] interpretation of the Constitution because 'the ultimate power and authority
to interpret the Pennsylvania Constitution rests with the Judiciary, and in particular with

this Court."' Id. (quoting Stilp v. Commonwealth, 905 A.2d 918, 948 (Pa. 2006)).
23. See generally White v. Smith, 42 A. 125 (Pa. 1899); Donohugh's Appeal v. The Library
Co. of Phila., 86 Pa. 306 (Pa. 1878). These are examples of early cases where the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided issues of charitable tax-exemptions.
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conferred by special legislative grants to property owned by hospitals, religious groups, educational institutions, and other private
and corporate organizations. 2 4 Because the Pennsylvania Legislature could grant an exemption to any property it wanted, those special grants often resulted in favoritism, whereby exemptions were
granted to some properties and not to others. 2 5 While a large majority of the exemptions granted went to true charities, as the Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted in Donohugh's Appeal, "[s]ome of
these were, at best, only private charities, and some of them ...
were not charities at all, but mere trading corporations for private
and individual profit." 2 6 This practice ceased, however, after the
Pennsylvania Constitution of 1874 passed, which declared that tax
exemptions should instead only be allowed by general law, 2 7 and
when the Act of 1874 later specified for which particular classes of
property. 28 As the court in Donohugh's Appeal explained, this restriction on the power to grant tax exemptions evidenced the resolve

24. Donohugh'sAppeal, 86 Pa. at 311-12. In Donohugh's Appeal, the court explains the
history of charitable tax exemptions in Pennsylvania and notes that the state legislature
passed one hundred and thirty acts between 1850 and 1873 exempting private or corporate
property from taxation that fell into the following categories: institutions of public benevolence for the poor; hospitals; literary, scientific and educational institutions; religious
churches and parsonages; cemeteries or burial places; military institutions; institutions of
private benevolence; and those other miscellaneous or doubtful cases. Id.
25. Id.; see also White, 42 A. at 125. The court in White stated that "[p]revious to the
constitution and Act of 1874, the legislature, by special act, relieved from taxation just what
property it saw fit, whether the property was charitable, religious, or even devoted solely to
purposes of corporate or private gain." Id. "The legislative habit had grown into a great
abuse." Id.
26. Donohugh'sAppeal, 86 Pa. at 311 (using cemeteries as an example). Moreover, Pennsylvania politics during the period leading up to the adoption of the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1874 was notorious for being corrupt. Donald Marritz, Making Equality Matter
(Again): The ProhibitionAgainst Special Laws in the Pennsylvania Constitution, 3 WIDENER
J. PUB. L. 161, 187, 190 (1993). Most of the legislation enacted during this time was special
legislation, which resulted in a "[g]overnment . .
corrupted by the 'blight of special legislation which like a black mold spread its mycelium beneath the political surface."' Id. Furthermore, during this period, "[t]he concentration of money held by private, powerful corporations exerted a disproportionate, if not all-consuming, influence on the legislature." Id. at
186. The legislature often sacrificed the public interest for private or personal interests. Id.
27.
Donohugh'sAppeal, 86 Pa. at 308. In Donohugh'sAppeal, the court states:
Article 9, section 1, of the new constitution of Pennsylvania [of 1874] declares
"[a]ll taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects within the territorial
limits of the authority levying the tax, and shall be levied and collected under
general laws; but the General Assembly may, by general laws, exempt from taxation public property used for public purposes, actual places of religious worship,
places of burial not used or held for private or corporate profit[,] and institutions
of purely public charity."

Id.
28.

Id. at 308-309. The court notes:
The Act of May 14th 1874, Pamph. L. 158, passed to carry into effect this constitutional provision, provides that "all churches, meeting-houses, or other regular
places of stated worship, with the grounds thereto annexed, necessary for the oc-
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to abolish the favoritism that resulted from special legislation and
to put "a limit upon the legislative power to exempt which was before unlimited." 29 Furthermore, by abolishing exemptions by special legislation, courts could only determine if a property qualified
for a tax exemption as an institution of purely public charity by undertaking the difficult task of looking to the particular facts of the
case. 30
B.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court Fashions the HUP Criteria

While the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1874 and Act of 1874 laid
a framework for the law on charitable tax exemptions, neither defined "institution of purely public charity," and certain criteria, at
times conflicting, later developed through case law. 3 1 In a landmark charitable tax exemption case decided in 1985, Hospital Utilization Project v. Commonwealth ("HUP'), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court chronicled the various criteria Pennsylvania courts
had used over the past one hundred years to define institutions of
purely public charity. 32 For example, early case law required that
the benefits resulting from a charitable institution's acts must go to
the public, and that the institution could reserve no private or pecuniary return. 33 Additionally, Pennsylvania courts had also held
that "[w]hat is 'given' must be more nearly gratuitous than for a
price" and that a charitable organization must render services to
those that are "legitimate subjects of charity." 3 4 Further, in HUP,
cupancy and enjoyment of the same; all burial-grounds not used or held for private or corporate profit; all hospitals, universities, colleges, seminaries, academies, associations, and institutions of learning, benevolence or charity, with the
grounds thereto annexed, and necessary for the occupancy and enjoyment of the
same, founded, endowed, and maintained by public or private charity" together
with public school-houses, court-houses, jails, &c., are hereby exempted from all
and every county, city, borough, road, and school tax, with a proviso that the exemption shall not extend to property not in actual use for the purposes specified,
and from which any income or revenue is derived.

Id.
29. Id. at 312; see also White, 42 A. at 125-26. Furthermore, because the Pennsylvania
Constitution of 1874 "was drafted in an atmosphere of extreme distrust of the legislative body
and of fear of the growing power of corporations . . . [1]egislative reform was truly the dominant motif of the convention and that purpose is woven into the very fabric of the constitution." Marritz, supra note 26, at 191.

30.
31.

White, 42 A. at 126.
See Hosp. Utilization Project v. Commonwealth, 487 A.2d 1306, 1312-14 (Pa. 1985);

see also White, 42 A. at 126 (stating that "the varying facts presented by the different cases
resulted in apparently conflicting legal conclusions as to the application of the designation
[of purely public charity]").

32.
33.

HUP, 487 A.2d at 1312-17.
Id. at 1312-13 (citing Episcopal Acad. v. Phila., 25 A. 55, 56 (Pa. 1892)).

34.

Id. at 1313-14 (quoting Young Men's Christian Ass'n of Germantown v. City of Phila.,

187 A. 204, 208 (Pa. 1936)).
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the court also mentioned the idea of the "quid pro quo" and that
"[t]he measure of an institution's gratuitous aid to those requiring
it is the measure by which the government is relieved of its respon-

sibilities."35
In HUP, the court's analysis of the historical considerations used
to determine if an organization qualified as an institution of purely
public charity resulted in a new, five-part definition which succinctly captured the above-mentioned characteristics. 36 Under the
HUP definition, an entity qualifies as an "institution of purely public charity" if it:
(a) Advances a charitable purpose;
(b) Donates or renders gratuitously a substantial portion of its
services;
(c) Benefits a substantial and indefinite class of persons who are
legitimate subjects of charity;
(d) Relieves the government of some of its burden; and
(e) Operates entirely free from private profit motive. 37
Following HUP, these five criteria became the test for determining
institutions of purely public charity. 3 8
The court's analysis in the HUP case provides an excellent example of the application of the new criteria. 39 In HUP, the court explained that plaintiff, Hospital Utilization Project ("HUP"), a health
record data processing company challenging the denial of its taxexempt status, 40 was not charitable because: its mission to reduce
operating costs at hospitals was not a gift to the general public; 4 1
HUP did not donate or render gratuitously any of its services because all of its clients paid fees approximating the actual costs of

35.
36.
37.
38.

Id. at 1314 (quoting YMCA of Germantown, 187 A. at 210).
Id. at 1317.
Id.
See Guthrie Clinic v. Sullivan Cty. Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 898 A.2d 1194, 1198

(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2006) (stating generally that an institution must first demonstrate that it
is a purely public charity by meeting the test set forth in HUP).

39.
40.

HUP, 487 A.2d at 1317-19.
Id. at 1307-08.

41. Id. at 1317. HUP is an organization, created by an association of hospitals, which
prepares statistical abstracts of patient medical record data upon their discharge and provides the information to participating hospitals so that each institution can compare its statistics to those of other hospitals. Id. at 1309. HUP is not "charitable' in the legal sense,"
and therefore failed to advance a charitable purpose. Id. at 1315.
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the services; 42 and the hospitals and health care facilities that HUP
serviced were not legitimate subjects of charity. 4 3 Additionally, the
court concluded that HUP was not relieving the government of a
burden because the type of research service it provided was not typically undertaken by the government4 4 and, also, that HUP was not
operating entirely free from private profit motive because its officers and directors were well-paid and the company generated a profit
that it invested back into its operation. 4 5 As a result of these findings, the court held that HUP was not entitled to a property tax
exemption as an institution of purely public charity. 4 6

After the HUP criteria were established, many charitable organizations and local governments were uncertain about which entities
still qualified as tax-exempt institutions of purely public charity. 47

Some commentators noted how the court's definition of "institution
of purely public charity" after HUP established a "set of requirements more detailed and certainly less flexible than the approach
previously used by the courts," 4 8 which created confusion and resulted in increased litigation. 4 9 One reason in particular the HUP
criteria may have been considered less flexible is because it became
the only way of identifying institutions of purely public charity,
from a test that "condense[d] over one hundred years of case

42. Id. at 1317. The court noted that because clients must pay fees in order to receive
the statistical reports, HUP's "operation is devoid of the eleemosynary characteristics generally associated with charitable organizations." Id. HUP therefore failed to donate or render
gratuitously a substantial portion of its services. Id.
43. Id. The hospitals and health care facilities that HUP services are administrative
entities, and are the ones who benefit from HUP's services by being able to cut operating
costs after comparing what they do to other facilities. Id. Therefore, "[a]ny benefit to the
sick or infirm is secondary and incidental. In this context, hospitals and health care services,
some of which are operated for profit, do not fall within the genre of the poor, incapacitated,
distressed or needy." Id. HUP therefore failed to benefit a substantial and indefinite class
of persons who are legitimate subjects of charity. Id.
44. Id. at 1317 n.10. HUP therefore failed to relieve the government of some of its bur-

den. Id.
45. Id. at 1317-18. In its analysis, the court also explained that "[i]n many respects it is
difficult to distinguish HUP from any other commercial enterprise." Id. at 1318. HUP therefore failed to operate entirely free from private profit motive. Id. at 1317-18.

46.

Id. at 1318.

47. See Prescott, supra note 12, at 957 (discussing generally the aftermath of the HUP
decision); Patrick Sullivan, Pennsylvania's Property Tax Exemption Might Go to Voters,
NONPROFIT TIMES (Sept. 13, 2013), http://www.thenonprofittimes.com/news-articles/pennsylvanias-property-tax-exemption-might-go-to-voters/
(explaining the "climate of uncertainty" surrounding tax exemption determinations and that the HUP test did not give organizations any guidance on how to meet or adhere to the criteria).
48. Prescott, supra note 12, at 957.
49. Id. See also Andy Carter, PA History Shows the Wisdom of SB 4 and Nonprofit Tax
Exemptions, HOSP. AND HEALTHSYSTEM ASS'N OF PA. (Mar. 13, 2015), https://www.haponline.org/Newsroom/Blog-Postings/ID/879/PA-History-Shows-the-Wisdom-of-SB-4-andNonprofit-Tax-Exemptions.
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law[.]" 5 0 Additionally, the resulting confusion was due in part to
different courts in different parts of the state interpreting the HUP
criteria differently and therefore ruling differently.5 1 This consequently resulted in increased litigation, as is exemplified by The
Hospital and Healthsystem Association of Pennsylvania's ("HAP")
claim that "Pennsylvania courts presided over at least 20-25 ongoing legal challenges between hospitals and political subdivisions"
alone. 52
C.

The Pennsylvania LegislatureInstitutes Act 55

In recognition of the increasing confusion 53 and concern over the
inconsistent application of the HUP criteria, 54 the Pennsylvania
Legislature passed the Institutions of Purely Public Charities Act
55 ("Act 55") in 1997.55 Act 55 set much more detailed legislative
standards for determining the eligibility of institutions of purely
public charity, which could be applied uniformly throughout the
state, thereby eliminating the inconsistent application of the HUP
criteria, confusion among both the courts and the institutions themselves, and increased litigation stemming from the issue.5 6 Similar
to the five HUP criteria, Act 55 also included sections regarding
charitable purpose,5 7 private profit motive,5 8 community service, 59
charity to persons,60 and government service,61 as the basis for its
new detailed criteria for "institutions of purely public charity."
However, while Act 55 principally reiterated and expanded upon
the HUP criteria, it also noticeably "relaxed some of the requirements for meeting the HUP Test." 62 In particular, Act 55 broadened
50.
51.
52.

Prescott, supra note 12, at 957.
Carter, supra note 49.
Id. (emphasis added).

53.

Institutions of Purely Public Charity Act, 10 PA. CONS. STAT.

§ 372(a)(4)

(1997) ("(a)

Findings . . (4) Lack of specific legislative standards defining the term 'institutions of purely
public charity' has led to increasing confusion and confrontation among traditionally taxexempt institutions and political subdivisions to the detriment of the public.").

54.

Id.

§

372(a)(5) ("(a) Findings . .

(5) There is increasing concern that the eligibility

standards for charitable tax exemptions are being applied inconsistently, which may violate
the uniformity provision of the Constitution of Pennsylvania").

55.
56.

Id. §§ 371-385.
Id. § 372(b).

57. Id. § 375(b) ("The institution must advance a charitable purpose.").
58. Id. § 375(c) ("The institution must operate entirely free from private profit motive.").
59. Id. § 375(d)(1) ("The institution must donate or render gratuitously a substantial portion of its services.").
60. Id. § 375(e)(1) ("The institution must benefit a substantial and indefinite class of persons who are legitimate subjects of charity.").
61. Id. § 375(f) ("The institution must relieve the government of some of its burden.").
62. PA. DEP'T OF THE AUDITOR GEN., supra note 9, at 2. As explained below, this creates
tension between the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and the Pennsylvania Legislature. Id.
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prong (b) of the HUP test, that an institution "donate[] or render[]
gratuitously a substantial portion of its services," and prong (e),
that it "[o]perate[] entirely free from private profit motive." 63 For
example, in HUP, the court explained that the determination of
whether an organization satisfies the requirement that it donate or
render gratuitously a substantial portion of its services is made by
looking at the facts and circumstances of each case. 64 Yet, Act 55
implemented a bright-line test, allowing organizations to satisfy
this prong by meeting "safe harbor" standards, such as only maintaining an open admissions policy or by simply offering some services at no charge to some portion of those served by the organization. 6 5 Additionally, Act 55 also significantly broadened the issue
of compensation of officers, directors, and employees by requiring
only that compensation may not be "based primarily on the financial performance of the institution[,]" 6 6 giving organizations substantial flexibility in creating compensation packages to reward executives and employees based on the financial performance of the
institution.6 7 Similarly, Act 55 ignored factors sometimes considered by courts when evaluating private profit motive, such as large
advertising budgets or non-competition agreements, which are traditional markers of for-profit institutions.68
The differences in criteria generate the issue of which definition of "institution of purely public charity" is supreme. Id.

63. Hosp. Utilization Project v. Commonwealth, 487 A.2d 1306, 1317 (Pa. 1985); see also
10 PA. CONS. STAT. § 375(c)-(d) (1997).
64.

HUP, 487 A.2d at 1315 n.9. In this footnote, the court explains that:
Whether or not the portion donated or rendered gratuitous is "substantial" is a
determination to be made based on the totality of circumstances surrounding the
organization. The word "substantial" does not imply a magical percentage. It
must appear from the facts that the organization makes a bona fide effort to service primarily those who cannot afford the usual fee.
Id. See also Prescott, supra note 12, at 964-66.
65. Prescott, supra note 12, at 966-71, 996-97. By offering a generous bright-line test
instead of looking to the facts and circumstances of each case to determine if an institution
is donating or rendering gratuitously a substantial portion of its services, the legislature
expanded the opportunities for institutions to qualify. Id.

66.

10 PA. CONS. STAT.

§ 375(c)(3)

(1997) (emphasis added).

67. Prescott, supra note 12, at 993 (requiring no close scrutiny of executive compensation,
it is possible "[t]hat a charitable institution would commit resources otherwise available for
charitable purposes to a business use such as executive compensation . . . leav[ing] some
wondering about the current distinction between charities and commercial enterprise").

68.

Id. at 999-1001. See also Sch. Dist. of Erie v. Hamot Med. Ctr., 602 A.2d 407, 410-

15 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992) (affirming the trial court's conclusion that the organization had a
private profit motive). In Hamot, the court found evidence of private profit motive, in part
because "Hamot spent in excess of one million dollars in advertising in the 1987 fiscal year,
over $800,000 in the 1988 fiscal year and almost $700,000 for the 1989 fiscal year" and further because "[i]ts community relations department is staffed by eleven persons and operates
on an annual budget of over half a million dollars." Id. at 411. See also Pinnacle Health
Hosps. v. Dauphin Cty. Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 708 A.2d 1284, 1295 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1998) (concluding that non-competition clauses are evidence of private profit motive).
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As a result, Act 55 sharply divided those in favor and those
against the new legislative standards. Proponents of Act 55 applauded the legislature, believing the bill provided clearer standards that could be uniformly applied, thus resulting in fewer disputes over an organization's tax-exempt statuS 6 9 and providing the
issue of charitable tax exemptions with much-needed stability. 70
Conversely, opponents of Act 55 maintained that the bill's relaxed
requirements resulted in an overall lenient test, under which almost any organization could qualify.7 1 Notably, among the proponents of Act 55 were organizations such as the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center ("UPMC"), HAP, and the Pennsylvania State
Alliance of YMCAs, which would benefit from a more lenient test,
as opposed to those against Act 55, such as the local government
taxing authorities.7 2 Consequently, the issue of charitable tax exemptions was in flux and courts were left to grapple between the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's stated HUP criteria and the General Assembly's legislative standards laid out in Act 55.
D.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court Declares the HUP Criteria
Controlling in the Mesivtah Case

The tension between the perceived, stricter HUP criteria and
more lenient Act 55 standards came to a head before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 2012 in Mesivtah Eitz Chaim of Bobov, Inc.
69. Carter, supra note 49. Proponents essentially believed that Act 55 accomplished its
mission of reducing the negative consequences of the HUP criteria. Id. Under Act 55, "[t]he
same clear, consistent standards for tax exemption applied to nonprofits across the entire
state. Legal disputes about whether an organization should be tax exempt were few. Nonprofits (along with tax payers) were spared the uncertainty and legal costs of lengthy court
battles and appeals processes." Id.
70. Sullivan, supra note 47 ("[B]efore Act 55, it was a circus trying to operate without
any level of predictability . . . . Act 55 provided stability and predictability.").
71. Sean D. Hamill & Jonathan D. Silver, Ruling 'Game-Changer'forNonprofit Tax Status, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (May 2, 2012, 2:54 PM), http://www.post-gazette.com/business/businessnews/2012/05/02/Ruling-game-changer-for-nonprofit-tax-status/stories/201205020257. "Act 55 swung the pendulum toward a more lenient test, and everybody

who wanted exemptions was very happy about that and everybody who represents taxing
authorities was unhappy about that,' said M. Janet Burkardt, an attorney with the Law Offices of Ira Weiss, solicitor for Pittsburgh Public Schools." Id. For example, opponents argued
that the fact that exempt-status cases were rarely challenged after the Act passed was actually evidence of Act 55's leniency. Id.

72.

See Allegheny County Public Meeting to Discuss ConstitutionalAmendment on Tax-

Exempt Properties, Public Charities Testimony, PA. DEP'T OF THE AUDITOR GEN. (Mar. 12,
2015), http://www.paauditor.gov/Media/Default/Misc/FULL%20testimony%2Olist%20D2.pdf

(including transcripts of testimony of those in favor and opposed to Senate Bill 4, taken at a
public meeting discussing the proposed amendment). UPMC is a very large hospital system
primarily located in Western Pennsylvania. UPMC Facts & Stats, UNIVERSITY OF
PITTSBURGH MEDICAL CENTER, http://www.upmc.com/about/facts/pages/default.aspx

visited Dec. 26, 2016).

(last
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v. Pike County Board of Assessment Appeals ("Mesivtah").73 In Mesivtah, Mesivtah Eitz Chaim of Bobov, Incorporated, a nonprofit religious entity operating a summer camp that primarily offered classes on the Orthodox Jewish faith, appealed the Pike County Board
of Assessment's denial of its request for a charitable exemption from
real estate taxes. 74 A central fact at issue in the case was that while
the camp's facilities were open to the public, no county residents
used the facilities.7 5 The trial court also denied the request for an
exemption and the Commonwealth Court affirmed, applying the
HUP criteria and explaining that there was insufficient evidence to
prove the camp relieved the county government of some of its burden.76

On appeal before the Commonwealth Court, the charitable organization argued that because Act 55 defined 'burden relieving' more
expansively than the HUP test[,]" and because it met the standards
set out in Act 55 which was enacted after HUP77 and which thus
displaced the HUP criteria,7 8 it did not also need to satisfy the HUP
criteria. 79 The county, on the other hand, argued that the HUP criteria had been applied even after Act 55's enactment, and, further,
that the doctrine of separation of powers prohibited the General Assembly from interfering with the court's role in interpreting and defining the constitution-which it believed to be the case with Act
55.80 Accordingly, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was poised to
address the conflict between HUP and Act 55 by answering definitively whether the General Assembly had the right to influence the
constitutional definition of "institution of purely public charity"

through its enactment of Act

55.81

As its answer, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that Act 55
does not replace the constitutional minimum set out in the HUP
case.82 More specifically, if an entity meets the constitutional interpretation of purely public charity encompassed by the HUP criteria,
then it may qualify for an exemption if it also meets Act 55; but, if
73.
74.
75.

44 A.3d 3 (Pa. 2012).
Id. at 5.
Id.

76.

Id. This is prong (d) of the HUP criteria.

See Hosp. Utilization Project v. Common-

wealth, 487 A.2d 1306, 1317 (Pa. 1985).
77. Mesivtah, 44 A.3d at 6.
78. Id. at 6-7 ("It claims the HUP test was a stopgap measure displaced by the General
Assembly's definition[.]").
79. Id. at 6 ("Appellant argued that it need not satisfy the HUP test, since the General
Assembly enacted the Institutions of Purely Public Charity Act, 10 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 371385 (Act 55), after the HUP case was decided.").

80.
81.
82.

Id. at 7.
Id.
Id. at 9.
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an entity does not first qualify for exemption under the HUP criteria, then Act 55 does not apply. 83 As part of its reasoning in holding
the court's definition controlling over that of the General Assembly,
the court pointed out that no part of the Pennsylvania Constitution
grants the General Assembly "non-reviewable authority" to decide
what does or does not constitute an "institution of purely public
charity." 8 4 Furthermore, the court also returned to the idea that
the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1874 was intended to limit legislative authority in granting tax exemptions.8 5 The court reasoned
that the result of the charitable organization's argument would be
that the General Assembly could then define whatever entity it
wanted as an institution of purely public charity,86 and that, in essence, would defeat the constitution's very purpose of limiting legislative authority to grant tax exemptions.8 7
While the majority opinion in Mesivtah had resounding significance, Justice Saylor's dissent also brought up important observations.8 8 A large part of the dissenting opinion focused on the role of
the legislature and the court in defining "institution of purely public
charity." 89 The dissent pointed out that the issue of charitable tax
exemptions is a policy-oriented area where "legislative determinations [are] particularly important." 90 Consequently, if Act 55 is otherwise in line with the constitution, Justice Saylor believed that the
judiciary should defer to its standards, since Act 55 was the result
of a reasonable policy-decision to have a more efficient and uniform

83. Id. Specifically, the court held that a "party must meet the definition of 'purely public
charity' as measured by the test in HUP' in order "to receive an exemption without violating
the Constitution[.]" Id. "Ifit does so, it may qualify for exemption if it meets the statute's
requirements. Act 55, however, cannot excuse the constitutional minimum-if you do not
qualify under the HUP test, you never get to the statute." Id.

84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at 8.
Id.
Id.
Id. The court elaborated, explaining:
Accordingly, Article VIII, § 2 was designed not to grant, but limit, legislative authority to create tax exemptions. To eliminate judicial review of the constitutionality of the General Assembly's creations would defeat this purpose. The General
Assembly could, by statute, define any entity whatsoever as an 'institution of
purely public charity' entitled to exemption from taxes, returning to the practice
the constitutional provision was designed to eliminate. It could create classifications of charities so oblique it would turn § 2 into an exception that swallows the
uniformity requirement of Article VIII, § 1. Such a counterintuitive outcome
would be contrary to Article VIII, § 2's purpose of limiting the General Assembly's
ability to grant tax exemptions.

Id.
88.
89.
90.

See id. at 9-11 (Saylor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 10.
Id.
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application of the HUP criteria. 91 This argument becomes particularly important later on to those in favor of Senate Bill 4-the next
critical event in the evolution of institutions of purely public charity
in Pennsylvania.

III. THE PROPOSAL OF SENATE BILL 4 AND ITS AFFECT ON
THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS OF PURELY PUBLIC
CHARITY IN PENNSYLVANIA
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's interpretation of what constitutes an institution of purely public charity now faces a new challenge by way of the introduction of Senate Bill 4.92 Senate Bill 4,
introduced in early 2013, is a proposed constitutional amendment
to give the Pennsylvania Legislature the authority to determine the
criteria for "institutions of purely public charity" regarding property tax exemptions. 93 The proposed amendment reads,
The General Assembly may, by law . . . [e]stablish uniform
standards and qualifications which shall be the criteria to determine qualification as institutions of purely public charity.
94

Senate Bill 4 was introduced by Senators Mike Brubaker and Joseph Scarnati in reaction to the 2012 Mesivtah decision, and is intended to "clarify that it is the exclusive role of the General Assembly to write laws providing for the qualifications of institutions of
purely public charity." 95 Though in Mesivtah the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was simply engaging in its right to constitutional interpretation, Senate Bill 4's sponsors take issue with how the court
elevated its own judgment above that of the legislature, again caus-

91. Id. at 11. Justice Saylor pointed out that "specifying additional criteria for each
prong" through Act 55 did not "displace this Court's constitutional rulings or the HUP test
in its entirety. Rather, the General Assembly determined-as a matter of policy-that more
refinement was necessary for efficient, uniform application of that test and enacted legislation to serve that goal." Id.

92.

See S.B. 4, P.N. 347, Session of 2015 (Pa. 2015).

93.

Id.

94.

Id.

95. Memorandum from Senator Mike Brubaker and Senator Joseph Scarnati on Purely
Public Charities to All Pennsylvania Senate Members (January 28, 2013) [hereinafter Memorandum] (on file with the Pennsylvania State Senate) (emphasis added). This memorandum
predates the introduction of Senate Bill 4, and details the proposal of Senators Mike Brubaker and Joseph Scarnati to reintroduce legislation regarding purely public charities (now
referred to as Senate Bill 4). Id.
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ing confusion regarding the criteria for purely public charity status. 96 Therefore, Senate Bill 4 is meant to preserve the legislature's
role as policymaker and to finally provide certainty in this area of
the law. 9 7
In Pennsylvania, proposed constitutional amendments must pass
two two-year legislative sessions before being added to the general
election ballot to be approved by Pennsylvania voters. 98 Senate Bill
4 passed the 2013-2014 legislative session and passed in the Senate
in February 2015, and is now currently being considered by the
House Finance Committee. 99 While there are many procedural obstacles in its path to becoming law, Senate Bill 4's most formidable
obstacle may be the bitter controversy that surrounds it.
Part of this controversy stems from the uncertainty surrounding
the bill's potential impact on the future of charitable property tax
exemptions.1 00 While the bill gives the General Assembly the power
to establish standards for institutions of purely public charity,10 1 it
does not go beyond that and actually establish any standards. 102 In
fact, as one news outlet reported, "[t]he uncertainty stems from
what the amendment would not do. It would not change the definitions of purely public charities, nor the criteria set by the Legislature through the Institutions of Purely Public Charities Act 55 of
1997."103 The bill would give lawmakers the power to decide what
to do next-keep Act 55 as it is, revise it, or develop a new set of
standards governing tax exemptions for charitable institutions. 10 4
Or yet, as one commentator noted, Senate Bill 4 may do nothing, as
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would still be the final arbiter

96. Id. ("By elevating its own judgment above the will of the General Assembly, the Court
has created uncertainty as to the qualifications for public charities in Pennsylvania. Charitable organizations statewide could have their public charity status called into question
based on this decision.").
97. Id. (Senate Bill 4 is "legislation amending the Constitution to preserve the General
Assembly's role as policy maker in area of purely public charities and to provide certainty in
this area of the law.").
98. Senate Bill 4 and the Determination of Purely Public Charity for PA Nonprofits,
FORBES FUND, https://forbesfunds.org/state-taxation-issues (last visited Dec. 28, 2015).

99.

Id.

100. Lindstrom, supra note 12 ("Nobody is really sure what happens if the constitutional
amendment passes-does the standard become more restrictive? Less restrictive?' [Auditor
General Eugene] DePasquale said. 'Nobody has any idea."').

101.

S.B. 4, P.N. 347, Session of 2015 (Pa. 2015).

102. Id. The short text of the proposed legislation does not go beyond giving the General
Assembly authority to establish standards. Id.
103. Lindstrom, supra note 12.

104.

Id.
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over the constitutional phrase "purely public charity."10 5 Nevertheless, despite this uncertainty surrounding the bill, there has been
no shortage of vehement arguments raised both in favor and
against Senate Bill 4 and its supposed consequences.
A.

Arguments in Favor of Senate Bill 4

Many of the arguments in favor of Senate Bill 4 and the General
Assembly's ability to set criteria for charitable tax exemptions echo
those arguments that arose in favor of Act 55.106 In fact, many of
the strongest supporters of Senate Bill 4 include organizations that
also supported Act 55, such as UPMC, HAP, and the Pennsylvania
State Alliance of YMCAs-the beneficiaries of Act 55's leniency. 107
Additionally, several of the arguments in favor of Senate Bill 4 seem
to be founded in the belief that Act 55 will remain intact, or at least
that the climate surrounding charitable tax exemption determinations will be consistent with the lenient climate after Act 55's passage. 108
For example, supporters of Senate Bill 4 likewise believe that the
bill will create, 109 or restore, 1 10 a singular set of criteria that organizations can use to determine if they qualify as an institution of
purely public charity or not.111 A more detailed, singular set of criteria would result in a more objective and less complicated test,
providing the clarity that many argue is absent when using the
105. See PA. DEP'T OF THE AUDITOR GEN., supra note 72 (from the testimony of Dean Emeritus Nicholas P. Cafardi, Professor of Law at Duquesne University School of Law, on March
12, 2015) (stating that "[i]n our constitutional democracy, there is no such thing as a legislative act that is not able to be interpreted or reviewed by the third branch of government, the
judiciary. Nor is there a phrase in the Pennsylvania Constitution that the judiciary cannot
interpret").
106. See Carter, supra note 49. Proponents essentially believed that Act 55 accomplished
its mission of reducing the negative consequences of the HUP criteria. Id. Under Act 55,
"[t]he same clear, consistent standards for tax exemption applied to nonprofits across the
entire state. Legal disputes about whether an organization should be tax exempt were few.
Nonprofits (along with tax payers) were spared the uncertainty and legal costs of lengthy
court battles and appeals processes." Id. See also Sullivan, supra note 47.
107. PA. DEP'T OF THE AUDITOR GEN., supra note 72 (including transcripts of testimony of
those in favor and opposed to Senate Bill 4, taken at a public meeting discussing the proposed
amendment); Lindstrom, supra note 12; Lord, supra note 20.
108. This observation is based on the fact that support for Act 55 and Senate Bill 4 is
largely one and the same in many respects, as is exemplified below. See also Hamill & Silver,
supra note 71; PA. DEP'T OF THE AUDITOR GEN., supra note 72 and accompanying text.
109. PA. DEP'T OF THE AUDITOR GEN., supra note 72 (from the testimony of John W. Paul,
President and CEO of Allegheny Health Network, on March 9, 2015).
110. Id. (from the testimony of the Pennsylvania State Alliance of YMCAs).
111. Id. (from the testimony of John W. Paul, President and CEO of Allegheny Health
Network, on March 9, 2015 in support of Senate Bill 4) ("This bill simply aims to provide a
law that will create a singular set of criteria, by which nonprofits can use to clearly determine
if they need to pay taxes or provide community services.").
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court's HUP test. 112 As it was, instituting a singular set of criteria
that provided clarity was one of the most celebrated aspects of Act
55.113 Clarity benefits larger organizations, which have been the
most vocal in their support for Senate Bill 4, in addition to smaller
organizations with fewer resources. 1 1 4 This is arguably because by
continuing to apply the HUP criteria, which offers less guidance, on
a case-by-case basis, the criteria will continue to be applied inconsistently across the state. 115 Such inconsistency, supporters say,
leads to more costly litigation, which in turn results in higher costs
for the nonprofit entity and which could then lead to job loss and/or
reduced services and benefits.1 1 6
Supporters have also argued their support for Senate Bill 4 by
showing the negative consequences of not adopting it. For example,
some supporters maintain that by continuing under the court-imposed HUP criteria, nonprofit organizations will continue to face
frivolous challenges,1 1 7 which they believe will come from the "cashstrapped municipalities . . . using the court system against legitimate nonprofits to fill public coffers."11 8 A perceived frivolous challenge to an institution's tax-exempt status could result in less collaboration between local taxing bodies and nonprofits, and hinder
them working together to find solutions to some of the municipalities' revenue issues. 119 Perhaps less persuasive is the Pennsylvania
Association of Nonprofit Organizations' argument in support of
Senate Bill 4, which claims that passage of the bill will give them
the ability to influence local elected officials to support their
112. See Sullivan, supra note 47 (explaining the "climate of uncertainty" surrounding tax
exemption determinations and that the HUP test did not give organizations any guidance on
how to meet or adhere to the criteria).
113. Id. ("[B]efore Act 55, it was a circus trying to operate without any level of predictability' . . . 'Act 55 provided stability and predictability."').
114. PA. DEP'T OF THE AUDITOR GEN., supra note 72 (from the testimony of Tom McGough,

Executive Vice President and Chief Legal Officer of UPMC, on March 12, 2015) ("UPMC
believes that a less complicated, more objective test for IPPC status would benefit smaller
nonprofits, and particularly community hospitals . . .").
115. Id. (from the testimony of Patricia J. Raffaele, Vice President of Professional Services
as Hospital Council of Western Pennsylvania, on March 12, 2015) ("The current scenariodifferent courts rendering different opinions-is a barrier to clarity and consistency.").
116. Id. Patricia J. Raffaele explained that "[c]ostly court cases, inconsistent decisions
and the possibility of paying taxes will lead to continued erosion of our already financially
fragile providers, especially in the rural areas of our region." Id. Further, Raffaele noted that
"[i]ncreased costs to any healthcare provider can and will lead to lost jobs and reduced community services and benefits relied on by many individuals and their families." Id.
117. Lord, supra note 20.
118. Lindstrom, supra note 12.
119. PA. DEP'T OF THE AUDITOR GEN., supra note 72 (from the testimony of Tom McGough,
Executive Vice President and Chief Legal Officer of UPMC, on March 12, 2015) (stating that
"combative challenges to large nonprofits are less likely to generate good results for local
taxing bodies than are invitations to collaboration").
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cause. 12 0 Although it is impossible to know if Senate Bill 4 would
actually result in these speculated outcomes, the unknown has not
stopped supporters from continuing to loudly voice their approval

of the bill.
B.

Arguments against Senate Bill 4

Much of the criticism surrounding Senate Bill 4 concerns the parties actually behind the bill's introduction, such as UPMC, Highmark, and HAP, repeatedly judged as "mega-charities" that look
like for-profit corporations. 12 1 The Executive Director of Pittsburgh
UNITED claimed that these "mega-charities" are supporting the
bill because they fear "that some of their practices are threatened
in a regulatory environment that asserts the HUP test as the qualification for exemptions, and not the more lax standards set out by
Act 55."122 Consequently, there seems to be a strong belief on both
sides that the intent of Senate Bill 4 is to reduce accountability for
nonprofit organizations. 12 3 However, those opposed to Senate Bill
4 instead claim that these charities should be held accountable "to
the communities that subsidize them" and that when they are not
held to a high standard, like the one imposed by the HUP criteria,
"they burden people instead of lightening their load." 12 4 Such an
120. Id. (from the written statement of Anne L. Gingerich, Executive Director, Pennsylvania Association of Nonprofit Organizations, on March 12, 2015) (stating that a positive
outcome of Senate Bill 4 passing would be that "[n]onprofits could have the ability to influence their local delegation to support their cause"). Notably, this argument in favor of the
ramifications of Senate Bill 4 is very reminiscent of the corruption and legislative abuse leading up to the adoption of the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1874. See White v. Smith, 42 A.

125 (Pa. 1899).
121. See Lindstrom, supra note 12 ("UPMC and Highmark join the Hospital Association
of Pennsylvania in supporting SB 4"); PA. DEP'T OF THE AUDITOR GEN., supra note 72 (from
the testimony of Barney Oursler, Executive Director of Pittsburgh UNITED, on March 12,
2015) ("It's no secret the real movers behind amending the constitution to remove judicial
oversight of purely public charities are not soup kitchens and small non-profits[.]").
122. PA. DEP'T OF THE AUDITOR GEN., supra note 72 (from the testimony of Barney Oursler, Executive Director of Pittsburgh UNITED, on March 12, 2015). "Pittsburgh United is a
coalition of community, labor, faith, and environmental organizations committed to advancing the vision of a community and economy that work for all people." PITTSBURGH UNITED,
http://pittsburghunited.org (last visited Apr. 9, 2017).
123. PA. DEP'T OF THE AUDITOR GEN., supra note 72 (from the testimony of Barney Oursler, Executive Director of Pittsburgh UNITED, on March 12, 2015) (Senate Bill 4 is an
"amendment that today strikes me and many others in our community as a constitutionally
guaranteed loophole for a few giant not-for-profits"). "[T]he intent and effect of the amendment is clear: to reduce accountability for mega-charities like UPMC." Id. (from the testimony of Lois Campbell, Executive Director of Pennsylvania Interfaith Impact Network, on
March 12, 2015). "PANO, the organization of nonprofits in PA, has advocated for the amendment on the grounds that by returning us to the more lax regulatory environment of Act 55,
charities are better shielded from challenge and accountability." Id.
124. Id. (from the testimony of Lois Campbell, Executive Director of Pennsylvania Interfaith Impact Network, on March 12, 2015). Lois Campbell also stated that "[w]hen charities
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argument is based on the notion that when someone does not pay
taxes, everyone else must pay more. 125 As a result, those opposed
to Senate Bill 4 believe that the criteria for charitable tax exemptions should be narrow because tax exemptions are "a privilege, not
a right." 126
Furthermore, while supporters of Senate Bill 4 believe that its
non-adoption will lead to less collaboration between local governments and charitable organizations, it has been suggested that even
under Act 55 and prior to Mesivtah, negotiations between local governments and large nonprofits were "basically a hat in hand begging exercise. "127 It was the Mesivtah decision, which affirmed the
superiority of the HUP criteria, which created a more equal footing
for negotiations by giving local governments leverage. 128 Furthermore, the "explosion of opposition from municipal leaders, unions,
police and fire associations, [and] school boards" is based on the
worry about the legislature even further broadening the standards
for charitable tax exemptions under Senate Bill 4, thus interfering
with their ability to challenge tax exemptions. 129 While the cost of
do not relieve government of burden, when they do not offer a significant portion of their
services without charge, when they do not benefit everyone and do not operate entirely free
of the private profit motive, . . . they create more problems than they solve." Id.
125. Id. (from the testimony of Dean Emeritus Nicholas P. Cafardi, Professor of Law at
Duquesne University School of Law, on March 12, 2015).
See also ALLEGHENY CTY.
CONTROLLER CHELSA WAGNER'S TAXPAYER ALERTS, supra note 9 (explaining that "[a]s property taxes are the main source of revenue for counties, municipalities, and school districts,
exempt property decreases the total available taxable property that can generate revenue for
these governments . . . [which] means that nonexempt, taxable properties bear a larger share
of the total tax burden"); Daphne A. Kenyon & Adam H. Langley, The Property-TaxExemption for Nonprofits and Revenue Implications for Cities, URBAN INST. 2 (Nov. 2011),
http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/412460-The-Property-TaxExemption-for-Nonprofits-and-Revenue-Implications-for-Cities.PDF
(explaining that exempting "nonprofits from property taxation means that homeowners and businesses must
bear a greater share of the property tax burden").
126. PA. DEP'T OF THE AUDITOR GEN., supra note 72 (from the testimony of Dean Emeritus
Nicholas P. Cafardi, Professor of Law at Duquesne University School of Law, on March 12,
2015). Tax exemptions are a privilege because the Pennsylvania Constitution says that "[a]ll
taxes shall be uniform, upon the same class of subjects," essentially meaning that everyone
has to pay taxes. PA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1. An exemption from taxation is a privilege because
one does not have to pay a tax that everyone else must pay. See generally id.
127. PA. DEP'T OF THE AUDITOR GEN., supra note 72 (from the testimony of Michael Lamb,
Pittsburgh City Controller, on March 12, 2015) (referring to negotiations for Payments in
Lieu of Taxes). Payments in Lieu of Taxes (PILOTs) are voluntary payments made by taxexempt nonprofits as a substitute for not paying property taxes. Kenyon & Langley, supra
note 125, at 6. PILOT payments typically result from negotiations between local governments and the individual nonprofit organizations. Id.
128. PA. DEP'T OF THE AUDITOR GEN., supra note 72 (from the testimony of Michael Lamb,
Pittsburgh City Controller, on March 12, 2015) (explaining that, "[a]s a matter of tax fairness,
having a more equal footing in this negotiation as provided in the Bobov ruling has helped
municipalities across the state. It has given leverage where there was none before.").
129. Lindstrom, supra note 12. Such groups argue that such a change would "make it too
difficult for municipalities to challenge the status of nonprofits." Id.
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increased litigation may be a concern to some, 130 making it too difficult to challenge the status of so-called "institutions of purely public charity" could be detrimental to local economies. In particular,
because non-profits own twenty to forty percent of properties
throughout Pennsylvania, 131 limiting a local government's ability to
challenge suspect tax-exempt status could result in a significant
amount of lost tax revenue.
One key argument critical of Senate Bill 4 focuses largely on the
concern over the power that should be granted to the legislature.
Specifically, while the language of Senate Bill 4 indicates that the
General Assembly would like to become the "sole arbiter" over the
issue of defining "institution of purely public charity," the legislature simply cannot ignore nor pretend that legislative acts and constitutional phrases will always be subject to judicial review. 132
Moreover, as those suspicious of the consequences of Senate Bill 4
have explained, "if the intention of the bill is to reinstate Act 55,
there is no need to transfer the power from the judiciary to the general assembly." 133 Contrary to arguments in support of Senate Bill
4, transferring power to the legislature could lead to more "uncertainty from one legislative session to the next" and/or an "increased
possibility of governmental overreach." 134 Consequently, because
130. PA. DEP'T OF THE AUDITOR GEN., supra note 72 (from the testimony of Patricia J.
Raffaele, Vice President of Professional Services as Hospital Council of Western Pennsylva-

nia, on March 12, 2015).
131. Lindstrom, supra note 12.
132. PA. DEP'T OF THE AUDITOR GEN., supra note 72 (from the testimony of Dean Emeritus
Nicholas P. Cafardi, Professor of Law at Duquesne University School of Law, on March 12,
2015). Dean Cafardi elaborated, explaining:
That authority [to decide what the conditions of tax exemption are] has historically resided with our state's Supreme Court, as the interpreter of the Pennsylvania Constitution. The General Assembly, however, would like to change the
status quo and become the sole arbiter in this case. It would like to set the conditions of tax exemption and say which institutions meet them, with no interference from the courts, and no review by the courts of their actions . . . I think that
result would be contrary to the basic principles of our state government. In our
constitutional democracy, there is no such thing as a legislative act that is not
able to be interpreted or reviewed by the third branch of government, the judiciary. Nor is there a phrase in the Pennsylvania Constitution that the judiciary
cannot interpret.
Id. The concept of judicial review refers to the power of a court to make decisions on the
validity of an act of the legislature in relation to the Constitution. Edward S. Corwin, Judicial Review in Action, 74 U. PA. L. REV. 639 (1926). The power of judicial review is incidental
to the court's power to hear cases and controversies. Id.
133. PA. DEP'T OF THE AUDITOR GEN., supra note 72 (from the testimony of the Greater
Pittsburgh Nonprofit Partnership, on March 12, 2015).

134.

Id. See also Donohugh's Appeal, 86 Pa. 306, 311 (1878) (explaining that the Penn-

sylvania Constitution of 1874 establishing exemptions by general law was in part because of
the problem that keeping the power in the hands of the legislature meant that "views of
successive legislatures might be more or less liberal on the subject," and this ultimately resulted in legislative abuse).
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governmental overreach rings of legislative abuse, we return to a
foundational principle of the legislature's ability to grant charitable
tax exemptions as established by the Pennsylvania Constitution of
1874.
C.

Returning to the Concern of Legislative Abuse

The proposed power to be granted to the Pennsylvania Legislature through Senate Bill 4 is reminiscent of the legislative abuse
that the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1874 was designed to curtail. 1 3 5 The court in Mesivtah addressed this issue when it noted
that:
Article VIII, § 2 was designed not to grant, but limit, legislative
authority to create tax exemptions. To eliminate judicial review of the constitutionality of the General Assembly's creations would defeat this purpose. The General Assembly could,
by statute, define any entity whatsoever as an "institution of
purely public charity" entitled to exemption from taxes, returning to the practice the constitutional provision was designed to

eliminate.136
A grant of power on this scale, where the court's criteria seemingly
is taken out of the equation, like that proposed in Senate Bill 4,137
could very well result in serious, negative consequences. Historically, leaving exemption determinations up to the General Assembly completely has proven to result in favoritism, whereby some organizations unfairly benefit while others do not. 138 Under Senate
Bill 4, the legislature would be in a position to make entirely discretionary decisions, if there were no check on its power. 139 Again,
135. See White v. Smith, 42 A. 125 (Pa. 1899). "Previous to the constitution and Act of
1874, the legislature, by special act, relieved from taxation just what property it saw fit,
whether the property was charitable, religious, or even devoted solely to purposes of corporate or private gain. The legislative habit had grown into a great abuse." Id. During this
period "[t]he concentration of money held by private, powerful corporations exerted a disproportionate, if not all-consuming, influence on the legislature. . . . State government was characterized as 'relatively unfettered state legislatures responding to powerful economic interests."' Marritz, supra note 26, at 186-87. The legislature often sacrificed the public interest
for private or personal interests. Id.
136. Mesivtah Eitz Chaim of Bobov, Inc. v. Pike Cty. Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 44 A.3d

3, 8 (2012).
137. S.B. 4, P.N. 347, Session of 2015 (Pa. 2015) (containing language that proposes to
instead give the General Assembly the power to establish qualifications for determining institutions of purely public charity).

138.

See Donohugh's Appeal, 86 Pa. at 311; White, 42 A. at 125.

139. See Donohugh's Appeal, 86 Pa. at 311-12. Prior to the Pennsylvania Constitution of
1874, the legislature granted charitable tax exemptions through special, discretionary, legislative grants. Id.

294

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 55

allowing this sort of complete discretion has proven to lead to favoritism. 14 0 What's more, such a result would likely lead to entities
qualifying for charitable tax exemptions from property taxes when
they are actually undeserving of that privilege. 1 4 1 In sum, granting
power on the scale proposed and supposed of Senate Bill 4 might
essentially mean unlimited power for the General Assembly. 14 2
Several present-day facts support this concern that Senate Bill 4
may just lead to that type of legislative abuse. Many of the bill's
strongest supporters are very large nonprofit organizations that
have a lot of resources and power to devote to promoting their best
political interest, 1 43 and have absolutely done just that in the
past. 14 4 One news outlet reported on big tax-exempt institutions
being "vigorous political players," claiming that, for example,
"Highmark's [PAC] spent $203,000 last year[.] ... The hospital association's PAC spent $198,000, and the association spent another
$1.08 million on lobbying. UPMC employees gave at least $20,000
to the association's PAC, and made at least an additional $113,000
in donations to other political committees and candidates." 14 5 Such
an investment towards influencing the political agenda1 46 is arguably the surest way to be certain that legislation remains (even unfairly) in their favor. 1 47 And such influence may exacerbate the issue with undeserving exemptions, especially since that was a perceived problem with Act 55148 and Senate Bill 4 arguably purports
to perpetuate Act 55.149 In particular, Act 55 broadened both prongs
(b) and (d) of the HUP criteria, 15 0 and specifically relaxed the pri-

140. See discussion supra Part H.A.
141. Donohugh'sAppeal, 86 Pa. at 311. Prior to the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1874,
the legislature granted some charitable tax exemptions to corporations that were profit-motivated and not charitable at all. Id.; see also PA. DEP'T OF THE AUDITOR GEN., supra note
126 and accompanying text (stating that tax exemptions are "a privilege, not a right").
142. See Donohugh's Appeal, 86 Pa. at 311-12 (implying that when there is no restriction
or general law otherwise restricting the legislature's power to exempt, that power can be
unlimited).
143. See Lindstrom, supra note 12. Some of Senate Bill 4's largest supporters are organ-

izations like UPMC, HAP, and Highmark. Id.
144.

Potter & Lord, supra note 17.

145.

Id.

146. Id.
147. Favoritism is a by-product of granting the General Assembly sole power in making
tax-exemption determinations. See generally Donohugh'sAppeal, 86 Pa. at 311.
148. Hamill & Silver, supra note 71 and accompanying text.
149. See discussion supra Part HILA.

150. See Hosp. Utilization Project v. Commonwealth, 487 A.2d 1306, 1317 (Pa. 1985); 10
PA. CONS. STAT. § 372-385, § 375(c)-(d) (1997).
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vate profit motive prong by allowing institutions to spend considerable sums of money on compensation packages and advertising, but
still qualify for exemption. 15 1
Yet another fact in support of the belief that Senate Bill 4 may
lead to legislative abuse is the plain language of the bill itself, 152 as
well as the bill's supporters' stated intent to give the General Assembly ultimate authority. 153 For example, the intent to give the
legislature the "exclusive role" in defining "institutions of purely
public charity" 15 4 is arguably equal with intent to give the legislature unlimited authority. Both situations purport to eliminate or
reduce the input of the court. This could likely not be the case because, as stated above, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court still has
the power of constitutional interpretation over the phrase "institutions of purely public charity," and it has shown that it can interpret
that phrase more narrowly. 155 However, Senate Bill 4 remains troubling because, as history has shown, unlimited legislative power in
this area of the law did in fact lead to legislative abuse. 15 6 As the
balance of power between the legislature and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court remains in flux, there are genuine reasons to worry
that that could be the case again.

IV. THE DEBATE OVER LOST REVENUE AND
UNWARRANTED EXEMPTIONS
The concern over Senate Bill 4, possible legislative abuse, and
allowing more supposed charitable institutions to qualify for property tax exemptions is fueled in part by (1) the growing distress over
lost revenue due to property tax exemptions and (2) the belief that
many organizations no longer warrant exemption.

151.

See 10 PA. CONS. STAT.

§§

372-385,

§ 375(c)(3)

(1997) (noting that an institution op-

erates entirely free from private profit motive when "[c]ompensation, including benefits, of
any director, officer or employee, is not based primarily upon the financial performance of
the institution") (emphasis added); Prescott, supra note 12, at 993 (stating that Act 55 wholly
broadens the issue of compensation of officers, directors and employees by leaving charities
with "considerable flexibility in crafting compensation packages" to reward executives and
employees based on the financial performance of the institution).

152.

See S.B. 4, P.N. 347, Session of 2015 (Pa. 2015).

153. Memorandum, supra note 95. Senate Bill 4 is intended to "clarify that it is the exclusive role of the General Assembly to write laws providing for the qualifications of institutions of purely public charity." Id.

154.

Id.

155.

Mesivtah Eitz Chaim of Bobov, Inc. v. Pike Cty. Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 44 A.3d

3, 7-9 (Pa. 2012).
156. White v. Smith, 42 A. 125 (Pa. 1899).
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Lost Revenue from CharitableProperty Tax Exemptions

There is a very real concern today that property tax exemptions
are causing an increasingly heavy burden to fall on municipalities
and taxpayers. 15 7 One of the strongest arguments behind this concern is that when charitable organizations are granted exemptions
from taxation, everyone else must pay more.15 8 More specifically,
in this scenario, because "property taxes are the main source of revenue for counties, municipalities, and school districts, exempt property decreases the total available taxable property that can generate revenue for these governments. This means that non-exempt,
taxable properties bear a larger share of the total tax burden." 159
What's more, taxable properties are also burdened with the responsibility of still paying to provide tax-exempt organizations with
police protection, fire protection, and other public services. 160 This
issue is also further exacerbated by the reality that many tax-exempt organizations are providing services to benefit people outside
of the areas they are located, 161 similar to the problem encountered
in Mesivtah. 162 For example, two common illustrations of this consequence are the realities that "hospitals normally serve an entire
metropolitan area, not a single city; [and] many universities educate students from around the world. Yet the cost of the exemption
is borne entirely by the municipality where the nonprofit is located." 163 Now, it should be noted that this concern must be balanced against the good these institutions do for the communities

157. See Kenyon & Langley, supra note 125, at 2 (explaining that "[f]or cities heavily reliant on the property tax, the exemption of nonprofits from property taxation means that homeowners and businesses must bear a greater share of the property tax burden"). This can be
especially concerning during hard economic times and when tax-exempt nonprofits make up
a significant portion of a municipality.
158. Id. See Young Men's Christian Ass'n of Germantown v. City of Phila., 187 A. 204,
210 (Pa. 1936) ("When any inhabitant fails to contribute his share of the costs . .
some other
inhabitant must contribute more than his fair share of that cost.").
159. ALLEGHENY CTY. CONTROLLER CHELSA WAGNER'S TAXPAYER ALERTS, supra note 9.

160.

See YMCA of Germantown, 187 A. 204, 210 (Pa. 1936) ("Every inhabitant and every

parcel of property receives governmental protection. Such protection costs money."); Kenyon
& Langley, supra note 125, at 2 (noting that "municipalities still need to pay to provide these
nonprofits with public services like police and fire protection and street maintenance").
161. Kenyon & Langley, supra note 125, at 8.
162. Mesivtah Eitz Chaim of Bobov, Inc. v. Pike Cty. Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 44 A.3d

3, 5 (2012).
163. Kenyon & Langley, supra note 125, at 8. See also Evelyn Brody, All Charities are
Property-Tax Exempt, but Some Charities are More Exempt Than Others, 44 NEW ENG. L.
REV. 621, 637 (2010) (discussing that a charity benefiting the public does not mean the benefit has to necessarily be geographic). However, such a reality provides a sound argument
for the suggestion that the "relieves the government of some of its burden" prong in HUP
should refer to the county, city, and schools whose taxes the exempt organization is not paying.
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they are located in, such as revitalizing or generating other income
for the area. Nevertheless, because these are tough economic times
for local governments and individuals all around, it is easy to see
why residents may be less than willing to continue supporting such
large property-tax-exempt institutions.
Residents may be less than willing to continue supporting some
of these institutions especially in light of figures which show just
how much real estate certain tax-exempt institutions own. Nonprofits own approximately "20 to 40 percent of properties located in
Pennsylvania cities" 16 4 -quite a substantial amount. Additionally,
other research has revealed that tax-exempt properties "account for
about $1.5 billion in untapped tax revenue" across the state. 165 It
is important to note that this figure does include tax-exempt properties owned by the government, not just properties owned by taxexempt institutions of purely public charity. 16 6 Therefore, one must
consider that lost revenue due to tax-exempt properties is not entirely because of the tax-exempt status of non-profits.1 6 7 Yet, one
can get a sense of just how much the total potential property tax
liability may be for institutions of purely public charity by examining medical facilities alone. In a report prepared by the Pennsylvania Department of the Auditor General in 2014, research showed
that the total potential property tax liability for medical facilities
with purely public charity status in 2014 amounted to over $177
million for only ten counties in Pennsylvania. 16 8 As these are considerable amounts of money that the municipalities, and the activities they support, are losing out on, it is no wonder that there has
been a much closer weighing of the good these tax-exempt charitable institutions do for the community versus what they cost it.

164.
165.

Lindstrom, supra note 12.
Id.

166.

Id.

167. Id. For example, in Allegheny County, the percentage of the total share of potential
revenue that could be generated if tax-exempt properties were taxed is: 15.64% for County
Government and 8.11% for Municipal Government. ALLEGHENY CTY. CONTROLLER CHELSA
WAGNER'S TAXPAYER ALERTS, supra note 9, at 2.
168. PA. DEP'T OF THE AUDITOR GEN., supra note 9, at 7. These ten counties include:
$76,124,321 for Allegheny County; $2,675,644 for Beaver County; $15,557,615 for Bucks
County; $16,512,001 for Dauphin County; $7,181,931 for Erie County; $6,280,067 for Lackawanna County; $18,184,315 for Lehigh County; $9,613,394 for Luzerne County; $1,149,444
for Monroe County; and $24,135,955 for Montgomery County. Id. These figures include "the
sum of county, municipal, and school district taxes for parcels owned by medical facilities."

Id.
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The Concern That Some CharitableProperty Tax Exemptions
Are Unwarranted

Close scrutiny of tax-exempt charities also exists particularly in
light of a growing belief that many tax-exemptions are being
granted to organizations underserving of them. Historically, there
used to be a clearer distinction between for-profit institutions operating under an idea of profit maximization and non-profit institutions, which traditionally were not supposed to generate profits at
all. 169 However, "[a]s society has evolved and as charitable segments within the nonprofit sector have modernized, notions of the
types of activities that constitute charity have changed." 170 As such,
there is a tendency now for charitable institutions to look less like
eleemosynary entities that give gratuitously and more like large
for-profit corporations.17 1
Several characteristics of many of today's tax-exempt charitable
institutions have led to this belief. One consideration is the questionable level of charitable services actually being rendered. For
example, research has shown that "uncompensated care provided
by nonprofit hospitals for the most part may not be substantially
distinguishable from that given by for-profit hospitals." 172 This
means that nonprofit hospitals are not providing substantially
more free care than for-profit hospitals. Prong (b) of the HUP test,
however, would mandate that the charitable organization donate or
render gratuitously a substantialportion of its services. 173 One key
allegation criticizing the hospital-giant UPMC's tax-exempt status
is that UPMC donates less than two percent of its revenue to needy
patients. 174 Another criticism, primarily of hospitals, is based on
the acknowledgement that there have been instances of hospitals
169.

Nina J. Crimm, Why All is Not Quiet on the "Home Front"for CharitableOrganiza-

tions, 29 N.M. L. REV. 1, 21-23 (1999).
170. Id. at 21.
171. For example, in the case of hospitals, '[t]his change may have been fueled in part by
the proliferation of mergers, acquisitions, joint ventures and conversions of nonprofit hospitals . . . into for-profits." Id. at 23-24.

172. Id. at 22.
173. Hosp. Utilization Project v. Commonwealth, 487 A.2d 1306, 1317 (Pa. 1985) (emphasis added).
174. In 2013, Pittsburgh Mayor Luke Ravenstahl filed a lawsuit challenging the tax-exempt status of UPMC's properties in Pittsburgh. Jeremy Boren & Bobby Kerlik, Ravenstahl:
Pittsburgh sues to remove UPMC's tax-exempt status, TRIBLIVE (Mar. 20, 2013),
http://triblive.com/news/adminpage/3696701-74/tax-upmc-exempt#axzz3JoVW24sN.
Among some of the allegations in the lawsuit against Western Pennsylvania's largest health
care system is that UPMC pays several of its executives seven-figure salaries; it has closed
or scaled back operations that were underperforming; it donates less than two percent of its
revenues to needy patients; and it acts as a for-profit, international corporation that has
interests all over the world. Id.
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closing facilities in order to maintain a good financial performance.17 5 Because many hospitals were established in areas where
there was a great need for medical services, it is understandable
that their subsequent closures have left many with a feeling of
abandonment-both literally and figuratively-regarding the organization's supposed charitable purpose.1 76
Perhaps one of the most widely criticized characteristics of many
charitable organizations today is what they pay their top executives. Sums have reached what many believe to be extraordinary
levels, considering the longstanding requirement that institutions
of purely public charity should operate without private profit motive. 177 For example, a study by the Urban Institute revealed that
while "the typical chief executive received $169,000 at non-profit
hospitals and roughly $114,000 at colleges and universities[,]" in
some cases those numbers climbed into the millions.1 78 In addition,
many organizations also supplement high salaries with generous
expense accounts and other allowances. 179 While it is certainly very
true that many of these organizations must consider the need to
keep salaries and benefits high in order to attract the best talent

175.

Id.

176. Id. See also Phil Galewitz, Hospitals pack up in poor areas, move to wealthier ones,
CNNMONEY (May 1, 2015), http://money.cnn.com/2015/04/20/newsleconomy/hospitals-relocating/ (quoting Gerard Anderson, director of the Center for Hospital Finance and Management at the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health as stating "[h]ospitals were
established in inner cities where the greatest needs were and now, essentially, that charity
obligation has gone by the wayside as they are looking at their bottom line[.]").
177. See HUP, 487 A.2d at 1318. This criticism that charitable organizations are paying
their executives too much also relates back to a criticism of Act 55. See Prescott, supra note
12, at 993 (noting that Act 55 wholly broadens the issue of compensation of officers, directors
and employees by leaving charities with "considerable flexibility in crafting compensation
packages" to reward executives and employees based on the financial performance of the
institution).
178. Eric C. Twombly & Marie G. Gantz, Executive Compensation in the Nonprofit Sector:
New Findings and Policy Implications, URBAN INST. 2 (Nov. 2001), http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/310372-Executive-Compensation-in-theNonprofit-Sector.PDF ("In select cases, chief executives at nonprofit hospitals and higher education institutions are paid more than 1.5 million[.]"). For example, one news outlet reported "UPMC lavishes more than 20 of its executives with seven-figure salaries, including
President and CEO Jeffrey Romoff, who received nearly $6 million in compensation in 2011.
He made $4 million in 2010." Boren & Kerlik, supra note 174.
179.
Twombly & Gantz, supra note 178, at 3. "[N]on-profits act like other firms by supplying some chief officers with expense accounts or other allowances to purchase housing,
food, and clothing[.]" Id. For example, "UPMC rents the 'most expensive office space' in
Pittsburgh in the U.S. Steel building for [CEO] Romoff, who has access to a 'private chef and
dining room, chauffeur and private jet."' Boren & Kerlik, supra note 174.
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possible, executive salaries reaching levels in the millions only perpetuate the concerns about many tax-exempt charitable institutions operating with a strong private profit motive. 180
Similar arguments to those criticizing compensation revolve
around the high figures charitable organizations spend on fundraising and the low figures spent on program expenses. Experts recommend that a charitable organization's fundraising costs not exceed
thirty-five percent of the related contributions to an organization, 181
and that a charity's total expenses spent on the program and services it delivers hover around at least seventy-five percent. 182 One
extreme example of a tax-exempt Pennsylvania charity clearly not
meeting these basic recommendations is the Lower Paxton-based
Children's Cancer Recovery Foundation-ranked as one of "America's Worst Charities." 183 This particular organization used professional fundraisers to raise $34.7 million over ten years, but instead
of using most of that money for its charitable mission, instead paid
$27.6 million to the fundraisers and had less than one percent going
to direct aid. 184 While this may be considered a severe example, it
nonetheless provides at least some validation for concerns about organizations claiming to be charitable, when that may be a fact that
is clearly debatable.
While critics continue to point out flaws in the operations of today's charitable institutions, there are several counterarguments in
support of tax-exempt nonprofit organizations. For example, some
nonprofits might argue that they are providing services and bene-

180. Prescott, supra note 12, at 993. High salary levels for executives at charitable institutions generate concerns about the charitable institution being greedy and looking like a
for-profit institution. See Prescott, supra note 12 and accompanying text. This in turn may
make the charitable institution look underserving of its tax-exempt status (if the organization is property-tax-exempt). Id.
181. Patrick
Sullivan, Survey:
Charities Should Spend 23%
On Overhead,
THENONPROFITTIMES (Aug. 15, 2012), http://www.thenonprofittimes.com/news-articles/survey-charities-should-spend-23-on-overhead/.
182. CHARITY
NAVIGATOR,
http://www.charitynavigator.org/index.cfm?bay=content.view&cpid=470#P (last visited Jan. 2, 2016). Charity Navigator is a leading organization dedicated to providing the public with detailed information about the operations of various charitable organizations in an effort to make people aware of how the money they donate
is actually
being used.
CHARITY NAVIGATOR,
http://www.charitynavigator.org/index.cfm?bay=content.view&cpid=628#.VvwmQccOmu4 (last visited Mar. 30, 2016).
183.
David Wenner, Three central Pennsylvania charitiesportrayed negatively in investigative report, PENN LIVE (June 17, 2013), http://www.pennlive.com/midstate/index.ssf/2013/
06/worstcharitieschildrenscanc.html#incart-m-rpt-1.
184. Id.
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fits that would exceed the amount the organization would be obligated to pay in property taxes if it was not exempted.18 5 Such an
argument combats the assertion that some organizations may not
be donating or rendering gratuitously a substantial portion of their
services. Additionally, specifically regarding the health care industry, since there are no public hospitals in Pennsylvania, the continual operation of nonprofit hospitals assures that care for the poor
and underprivileged does not fall on the local government or taxpayers.1 8 6 This argument necessarily leads to the conclusion that
nonprofit hospitals are relieving the government of some of its burden. 187 Further, in response to the claim that many exempt organizations are actually operating for profit, almost any organization
could make the argument that they must generate more in revenue
than what they pay in expenses to avoid going out of business.1 8 8
Yet suspicions surrounding an institution's private profit motive
and what services are actually being rendered gratuitously, among
other things, continue to grow and are bolstered by the hard facts
calling into question just how "charitable" some tax-exempt organizations may be.

V. PROPOSED LIMITATIONS ON CHARITABLE PROPERTY
TAX EXEMPTIONS
Given the real concern regarding the extent of property tax exemptions granted to charitable institutions today, Pennsylvania

185. PA. DEP'T OF THE AUDITOR GEN., supra note 72 (from the testimony of Tom McGough,
Executive Vice President and Chief Legal Officer of UPMC, on March 12, 2015). In the case

of UPMC:
Last year, Mercy [Hospital] provided the community with approximately $53 million in free or uncompensated care per IRS guidelines. By contrast, the total
amount of property taxes that would be paid on its exempt real estate would be
$4.9 million, or less than ten percent of that charity care. In fact, the $53 million
in free or uncompensated care Mercy provides by itself exceeds the $48 million in
property taxes the Auditor General's report suggested all of UPMC's hospitals
would pay if their properties were put on the tax rolls.

Id.
186. Id. (from the testimony of Tom McGough, Executive Vice President and Chief Legal
Officer of UPMC, on March 12, 2015). Specifically, "Pennsylvania is the only large state in
the nation without public hospitals. As a result, the responsibility to provide medical care
for Pennsylvania's poor and underprivileged falls not upon taxpayers or local governments,
as it does in many states, but rather upon nonprofit hospitals like UPMC Mercy." Id. Public
hospitals would cost hundreds of millions of dollars to establish and operate. Id.

187.

Id.

188. Id. (from the testimony of Tom McGough, Executive Vice President and Chief Legal
Officer of UPMC, on March 12, 2015) (stating that "[a]ll companies, whether for-profit or
nonprofit, must try to generate more in revenues than they pay out in expenses if they want
to avoid going out of business").
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should consider adopting some measures that offset or restrict existing exemptions to alleviate these anxieties. There are several
responses available that could help to partially offset the impact of
lost revenue on municipalities due to charitable tax exemptions,
even though the Pennsylvania legislature has indicated a desire to
do the exact opposite through Senate Bill 4. For example, some
states have begun instituting user fees, where nonprofits pay fees
for services like water, sewer, and garbage collection. 189 Similarly,
some municipalities have also imposed municipal service fees,
which are payments somewhere between a fee and a tax that can
be charged solely to tax-exempt nonprofits, and that pay for public
goods normally funded by taxes, like street maintenance. 190 Although these fees do not make up for the substantial sums of lost
property tax revenue, they are a way for cities to recoup at least
some money from organizations, while the charitable institutions
retain their tax-exempt status.
One measure already used in Pennsylvania are Payments in Lieu
of Taxes (PILOTs), which are voluntary payments made by tax-exempt nonprofits as a substitute for not paying property taxes. 191 PILOTs are typically negotiated between local governments and individual nonprofits, can be in the form of annual or one-time payments, and may go into a municipality's general fund or can be paid
straight into a specific project or program. 192 While PILOTs can be
critical in making up for lost revenue, negotiations can often become
contentious and payments may be sporadic, since they are completely voluntary on the part of the charitable organization. 19 3 PILOTs can end up being very large sums of money, even into the
millions, which makes them more on par with lost tax revenues;
however, due to their voluntary nature, they are unreliable.
Yet other legislative actions are available for Pennsylvania to
narrow the law or general scope of property tax exemptions for charitable institutions. In order to address the concern that organizations are paying their executives too much, the state could consider
adopting a cap on executive compensation. A cap could ensure that

189.

Kenyon & Langley, supra note 125, at 5.

190.
191.
192.

Id.
Id. at 6.
Id.

193. Id. "PILOTs can provide crucial revenue for certain municipalities and are one way
to make nonprofits pay for the public services they consume." Id. "However, negotiations
can become contentious, and the often ad hoc determination of payment amounts results in
widely varying payments among similar nonprofits." Id. With existing conflicts between the
HUP criteria and Act 55, and now Senate Bill 4, it is easy to imagine that any PILOT negotiations might easily become contentious.
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compensation levels remain reasonable and that organizations do
not lean more towards operating for private profit motive. However, instituting a cap would also lead to issues such as where
should the cap be set at or the potential for limiting the ability of
charitable organizations to attract top talent. 1 9 4 Similar to a cap on
compensation, the state could also set a limit on what percent of its
budget tax-exempt charitable organizations can spend on fundraising. Additionally, the state might go even further and set a minimum on the percentage of its budget an organization should spend
on providing gratuitous services. Ensuring that organizations contribute at least a certain amount in free services would help to safeguard exemptions being granted to organizations that do indeed advance a charitable purpose and donate a substantial portion of their
services gratuitously. If the Pennsylvania Legislature could be persuaded to set limits, whatever they may be, the public's concerns
over undeserving charitable tax exemptions might easily be appeased.
State and local governments might also consider narrowing the
scope of charitable property tax exemptions by "phasing out property tax exemptions after a certain period." 1 9 5 This approach recognizes the local government's interest in preventing the loss of this
revenue stream indefinitely, 19 6 and might assuage local governments with the knowledge that they will receive money from the
charitable organizations at some future point. In addition, Pennsylvania might limit the number of acres that can qualify for exemption, which could ensure that an organization's continued expansion "not be at the expense of local government." 1 9 7 Such a
measure could be extremely effective when dealing with organizations like UPMC, for example, which consistently grow larger and
larger. The state might also consider setting a dollar limit on the
amount of property that can be tax-exempt. 19 8 This measure would
protect against organizations continually receiving exemptions

194.
195.

Prescott, supra note 12, at 993.
Gil A. Nusbaum, Weighing the Options on State and Local Property Taxes, 19

EXEMPTS 1, 5 (2007).
196. Id. at n.15. Specifically, this approach "would allow new organizations to get started
without the burden of having to pay property tax, while also recognizing the local government's interest in not losing this revenue stream indefinitely. Furthermore, this option also
allows the organization to plan for the eventual imposition of the property tax." Id.
197. Id. at n.16 ("This approach recognizes that there is a threshold reasonable level of
property ownership beyond which further expansion should not be at the expense of local
government.").

198.

Id.
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when they have such a good financial standing that no longer justifies further exemption. 199 While the key to many of these approaches is in adequately balancing the interests of the local governments with those of the tax-exempt charitable institutions, 200
they do represent very viable options for limiting charitable tax exemptions that would allow deserving institutions to maintain their
tax-exempt status, while also ferreting out underserving organizations and allowing local governments to make up some of that lost
tax revenue.
And though many of these proposals are appealing, there are arguably several reasons to take pause before adopting such restrictive measures. For example, it would be important to consider that
if a charitable organization no longer qualifies for a tax exemption,
it may be forced to cut services or benefits to the public in order to
maintain its financial stability. 201 The community could thus lose
out on a much needed or relied upon service. Further, if an organization cannot remain financially stable, it may be forced to close,
in turn possibly forcing the taxpayers or local government to bear
the burden of paying for the services the organization had offered. 202
This could overburden taxpayers already resentful of the burden
tax-exempt organizations have placed on them. Additionally, imposing more regulations might strain an already tenuous relationship between those in favor of more exemptions and those against
them, leading to less cooperation and an erosion of goodwill. 203
Nevertheless, despite these possible repercussions, many of the
measures discussed above do provide practical ways of meeting the
concerns in this area of the law discussed throughout this comment.
For example, imposing user and municipal fees could in part relieve
"cash-strapped" municipalities, while imposing caps on compensation or acreage could provide the clarity and consistency applauded
under Act 55 as well as the narrowness appreciated about the HUP
199. Id. at n.17 ("This method would provide another way to balance the interests of taxexempt organizations with those of local governments, with ownership of property beyond
the ceiling indicating that the organization has a level of wealth or ability to pay that does
not justify further exemption.").
200. Id.
201. PA. DEP'T OF THE AUDITOR GEN., supra note 72 (from the testimony of Patricia J.
Raffaele, Vice President of Professional Services as Hospital Council of Western Pennsylvania, on March 12, 2015) (stating that "[i]ncreased costs to any healthcare provider can and
will lead to lost jobs and reduced community services and benefits relied on by many individuals and their families").
202. Id. (from the testimony of Tom McGough, Executive Vice President and Chief Legal
Officer of UPMC, on March 12, 2015).
203.

PA. DEP'T OF THE AUDITOR GEN., supra note 72; see also supra text accompanying

note 119.
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criteria. Moreover, many of these measures could not only assuage
concerns about lost tax revenue and undeserving exemptions, but
they could provide that clarity, consistency, and narrowness-thus
acting as a happy medium to satisfy everyone's concerns.

VI. CONCLUSION
Pennsylvania has been faced with many challenges regarding the
concept of property tax exemptions for charitable institutions over
the past 100 years. The current struggle for power between the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court and the General Assembly, and taxexempt nonprofits and municipalities, present some of the most
complicated challenges yet. Senate Bill 4, however, is not the solution. Though the consequences of Senate Bill 4's potential passage
remain unclear, 20 4 one point of law that remains resolute is that the
Pennsylvania Legislature may not cut out the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's right to interpret the constitutional phrase "institutions of purely public charity." 2 0 5 Such a proposal is misguided, and
indeed worrisome, as the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1874 was
expressly designed to limit legislative authority in granting tax exemptions. 2 0 6
Instead of fighting the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and local
governments through Senate Bill 4, the Pennsylvania Legislature
should be looking at ways to compromise. Today's concerns over
lost tax revenue and unwarranted exemptions are real and unlikely
to go away. Many of the more restrictive measures on charitable
property tax exemptions suggested above could easily alleviate
those concerns, and still provide benefits to the legislature and nonprofits such as clarity and consistency. While it is easy to get
caught up in the political struggle surrounding the phrase "institutions of purely public charity," it is critical to remember the fundamental principle that tax exemptions are a privilege. 2 0 7 Therefore,
whatever future measures are adopted, or returned to, in defining
"institutions of purely public charity," as the Pennsylvania Supreme Court once so aptly stated, it remains essential "to reinforce

204.

Lindstrom, supra notes 100-103 and accompanying text.

205. Mesivtah Eitz Chaim of Bobov, Inc. v. Pike Cty. Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 44 A.3d
3, 7 (2012); see also supra text accompanying note 22.
206. Marritz, supra note 26, at 191.
207. PA. DEP'T OF THE AUDITOR GEN., supra note 72 (from the testimony of Dean Emeritus
Nicholas P. Cafardi, Professor of Law at Duquesne University School of Law, on March 12,
2015). "The Uniformity Clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution adds that the burden of
paying taxes should fall equally on us all." Id. "Accordingly, tax exemption is a privilege,
not a right. When some of us do not pay taxes, the rest of us must pay more." Id.
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the traditional characteristics of charities rather than to expand
their scope to the point that the term 'charity' is meaningless." 208

208.
1997).

City of Wash. v. Bd. of Assessment Appeals of Wash. Cty., 704 A.2d 120, 126 (Pa.

